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Abstract
How does one analyze the memorialization or remembrance of an event, or pair of
events, when they have been nearly forgotten? To many individuals, the Herero and Nama
Genocide in Namibia and the Maji Maji Rebellion in Tanzania are unknown; however, these two
events decimated a region and left a lasting impact that is still felt to this day. In recent years, the
Herero and Nama tragedy has become increasingly well-known to the international community.
But why has this genocide in Namibia become the focus of attention, while the atrocities in
Tanzania have remained largely unknown? Namibia’s connections to the Holocaust, in the form
of concentration camps, medical experimentation, and personal connections, have led many to
believe the event set a precedent for the Nazis; this, in turn, has led to more intense examination
and analysis of the event by scholars. Additionally, Namibia’s victims’ human remains were sent
to museums around the world, thus globalizing the genocide in Namibia. Further, the Herero
tribe in Namibia, which was nearly destroyed in the genocide, experienced a revival of power in
the 1920s, which culminated in the rise of a political party and kept the memory of the genocide
alive. Conversely, the core of the rebellion in Tanzania was driven by shamanism and witchcraft.
The witchcraft eradication movements which swept through Tanzania in the aftermath of the
rebellion destroyed the core of the Maji Maji Rebellion. Furthermore, the tribes at the core of the
rebellion in Namibia were eventually forcibly settled and decentralized, losing their power and
thus, losing their voice. Numbers, in both terms of German casualties and tribes involved, have
led to the Herero and Nama event receiving increased coverage as more Germans died in
Namibia and fewer tribes were involved.
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“German imperialism had largely broken the Herero’s and Nama’s power to resist, so that
in the remaining years of German colonial rule the peace of the graveyard reigned in the
territory.”1 Horst Drechsler’s adaption of a quote from German colonial official Paul Rohrbach
fittingly describes the silence that befell the region of present-day Namibia after two tribes – the
Herero and Nama - were nearly wiped from existence. How does one analyze the
memorialization or remembrance of an event, or pair of events, when they have been nearly
forgotten? To many, the Herero and Nama Genocide in German Southwest Africa and the Maji
Maji Rebellion in East Africa are unknown; however, these two events decimated a region and
left a lasting impact that is still felt to this day. The human costs of these two forgotten tragedies
were enormous and shockingly one sided, with one side losing nearly all the victims, but little
physical evidence remains and the memory of these events have all but disappeared. If these
events are not widely remembered or memorialized, how does one analyze the remembrance of
these events in Southwest Africa and East Africa? In reviewing subsequent literature and news
media regarding these two events, it becomes apparent that the Herero and Nama tragedy has,
only recently, become more well-known to the international community. But why has the
genocide in Namibia become the focus of attention, both within the country and internationally,
and not the atrocities in Tanzania? Connections to the Holocaust, in the form of concentration
camps, medical experimentation, and personal connections, has led many to say the Namibia
genocide set a precedent for the Nazis, leading to a closer examination of the event. Additionally,
the genocide in Southwest Africa has become more globalized, with many of the human physical
remains sent to museums around the world, even reaching locations in the United States and
Germany. The Herero eventually regained political clout and wielded a stronger political

1

Horst Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting: the struggle of the Herero and Nama against German imperialism (1884-1915) (New
York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1981), 231.

2

apparatus in the aftermath of the killings. Conversely, the witchcraft eradication movements
which swept through Tanganyika—modern day Tanzania—largely stamped out the core of the
Maji Maji Rebellion. Eventually the tribes became settled and decentralized and lost their
political clout. Additionally, the larger numbers of German dead in Southwest Africa may
correlate with increasing coverage, and subsequent remembrance, in German newspapers
compared to the rebellion in Tanganyika, where far fewer German soldiers died. The number of
tribes involved, two in Southwest Africa and thirty in East Africa, can also be an influential
variable in memorialization. These social and political variables have led to the recent
prominence of the Herero and Nama atrocities receiving critical attention in the past two
decades, while the events in German East Africa have remained largely out of the limelight.
The history of the Herero and Nama peoples in southwest Africa before the German
occupation of the region is one of conflict and tension. The region that would become known as
Southwest Africa, or Hereroland, under German occupation, was originally inhabited not by the
Herero or Nama, but by the San and Mountain Damara peoples.2 The Bantu ancestors of the
Herero soon grew in power in central Namibia throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
increasingly marginalizing the indigenous populations. Through the next century, the Herero had
become the leading power in central Namibia.3 This increase in power led to a transition in
Herero society, away from horticulture to the establishment of vast cattle herds.4
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Herero people populated what is today
central Namibia. The population totaled around 80,000 people. The Nama was a smaller tribe of
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20,000 individuals.5 The Nama inhabited the lands south of the Herero and had arrived in the
area in the mid-nineteenth century as they escaped the violence of the Boers in South Africa. The
Herero and Nama tribes would fight against each other many times; their conflict in 1880 led to
German occupation.6
The Germans had established missionary outposts in the area of southwest Africa in the
1840s. However, German colonialism did not take hold until forty years later.7 In late 1881, the
Germans sent officials to explore ore deposits in the area and in 1882 a German merchant, Adolf
Luderitz, acquired a land holding near the coast.8 Luderitz purchased this piece of land for 2,500
deutsche marks, two-hundred rifles, and a selection of toys.9 In April 1884, German Chancellor
Otto von Bismark indicated that he wanted full German control over the entire area, planning to
use the region of southwest Africa as a stepping stone for entry into the interior of the
continent.10 The land acquired by Germany was immense, over 360,000 square miles; it was
composed of 200,000 Africans—Herero, Nama, and Ovambo (the northernmost, and largest,
tribe).11 Soon after Germans began arriving in the mid-1880s, their prospective rule was soon
hampered. The colonizers were not able to legitimatize their claims to power due to the lack of
savagery among the natives, and the fact that both tribes were nomadic. 12 Additionally, German
colonization of Namibia was stunted by a lack of investment and resources. 13
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Despite initial difficulties, German officials, including Chancellor von Caprivi, pushed
for further control: “We possess South-West Africa once and for all; it is German territory and
must be preserved as such.”14 As German immigrants came into the region, they soon found
themselves outnumbered and isolated. The colonizers sheltered behind a number of protective
treaties signed between the German colonial administration and the local tribes. Between 1884
and 1885, the German government negotiated with the Herero leadership and eventually came to
an agreement. These treaties marked the beginning of settler expansion and systematic
expropriation of African tribal land. By 1888, German holdings in the area reached 835,000
square miles.15 The 1890s saw a new colonial governor, Theodor Leutwein, lead further
expansion efforts. He also formed a partnership with the chief of the Herero tribe, Samuel
Maherero, during the tribe’s conflict with the Nama. Using this relationship, the Germans further
increased their land holdings.16
With the Herero tribespeople under increasing pressure from an influx of German settlers
onto their territory, and an epidemic of rinderpest, which decimated Herero cattle stocks, 17
tensions began to rise. Despite the German government’s promises in the “protection” treaties it
had signed in the 1890s, by 1904 many believed that the colonial administrators were not
respecting the tribe’s customs or habits.18 The spark that would ignite these tensions occurred on
January 12, 1904 in the town of Okahandja, in the central region of the colony. This town had a
large population of Herero and was home to Paramount Chief Samuel Maherero. On January 10,
the German officer in command of the city, Lieutenant Ralph Zurn, was given information by a
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Boer trader who reported that he had seen a large column of 300 armed Herero heading for the
town two days prior.19 The soldiers and civilians held themselves up in the local fortress for two
days. Upon receiving a further report of a large number of tribal warriors, 20 German soldiers
began to fire upon the Herero.21 The violence had begun.
After Okahandja, the Herero successfully managed to capture all of Hereroland and laid
siege to fortified towns in the area. The tribe also managed to capture a majority of German
livestock and killed 126 German settlers.22 Reports of settlers being caught on farms, or captured
soldiers being killed in horrible fashions, including being buried alive or cannibalized, permeated
the newspapers of not just Germany but the world.23 This killing of settlers alarmed Berlin,
which immediately sent reinforcements.24
By April 9, 1904, Leutwein and the German forces had successfully advanced to the
mountains—their march supported by Nama scouts who fought with the Germans against the
Herero. After a subsequent defeat by the Herero, the German government replaced Leutwein
with a commander they thought would be more effective: Lothar von Trotha.25 General von
Trotha was a natural choice to lead the response to the uprising, having served during the East
African Wahehe Uprising in 1894, as well as in the Boxer Rebellion in China, gaining notoriety
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for his violent tactics.26 The General arrived on June 11, 1904, and immediately began setting
about a new, chilling policy regarding the Herero. In an exchange with Governor Leutwein, von,
Trotha stated that he “shall destroy the rebellious tribes by shedding rivers of blood and
money.”27
General von Trotha began to plan for a final, decisive battle to end the Herero threat to
the colony. Nearly 50,000 Herero, including 2,500 to 3,000 warriors, were held up at a mountain
known as the Waterberg, and it was there that von Trotha planned for a decisive battle. General
von Trotha felt a need to end the rebellion and annihilate the Herero , as he believed that if the
Herero were not wiped out, that a resurgence of their social customs would occur and lead to
further bloodshed for years to come.28 In his directives issued on August 4, 1904, von Trotha laid
out his plans for the attack. From troop placement, the goal of the Germans was to drive the
surviving Herero into the desert.29 A report from the Colonial German Command said as much:
“If, however, the Herero were to break through…the enemy would then seal his own fate,
doomed to die of thirst in the arid sandveld.”30
After two days of heavy fighting at the mountain that began on August 11, 1904, the
Herero fled. This flight followed the Germans’ tactical plan perfectly, with the Herero warriors,
and civilians breaking through the small German contingent to the southwest and retreating into
the desert.31 Despite the defeat and flight of the Herero, the violence was only just beginning.
Soon after fleeing the Waterberg, Herero numbers began to dwindle due to starvation and thirst,
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the few watering holes not enough to ensure the survival of all the refugees.32 On August 13, von
Trotha gave the command for the German forces to pursue the Herero into the desert.33 He
ordered the military to establish a 155 square mile cordon around the region to ensure that no
Herero escaped. In a letter von Trotha stated his objectives for this new campaign:
I believe that the nation should be annihilated…This will be possible in the water
holes from Grootfontein to Gobabis which are occupied… My intimate
knowledge… has convinced me of the necessity that the Negro does not respect
treaties, but only brute force.34
From August to September, the German military chased the Herero from watering hole
to watering hole, with many old, ill, women, and children killed as they ran for their lives.35
During this pursuit, von Trotha’s incessant racism, coupled with his soldiers’ lack of training and
frustration at their lack of success against the Herero, led to widespread atrocities and massacres
occurring throughout this brutal campaign.36 Jan Cloete, a Herero survivor of the campaign,
recounted that “the Germans set off in pursuit of the rest [of the Herero], and all those found by
the wayside and in the sandveld were shot down or bayoneted.”37 This pursuit continued until
early October, when the chase reached its geographical limits and the Germans, exhausted and
hungry, came to a halt.38
Finally, in October, the war against the Herero would take a genocidal turn, with the
issuing of General von Trotha’s infamous “annihilation order” on October 2, 1904.
I, the great general of the German soldiers, send this letter to the Hereros. The
Hereros are German subjects no longer. They have killed, stolen, cut off the ears
and other parts of the body of wounded soldiers, and now are too cowardly to
32
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want to fight any longer. I announce to the people that whoever hands me one of
the chiefs shall receive 1,000 marks, and 5,000 marks for Samuel Maherero. The
Herero nation must now leave the country. If it refuses, I shall compel it to do so
with the 'long tube' (cannon). Any Herero found inside the German frontier, with
or without a gun or cattle, will be executed. I shall spare neither women nor
children. I shall give the order to drive them away and fire on them. Such are my
words to the Herero people.39
The German general no longer saw submission as acceptable, only the disappearance of the
Herero nation as a whole.40 To make it seem somewhat humane, von Trotha issued a
supplemental order to his proclamation regarding women and children:
And the shooting of women and children is to be understood to mean that one can
shoot over them to force them to run faster. I diffidently mean that the order will
be carried out and that no male prisoners will be taken… but that it should not
degenerate into killing women and children.41
The General’s intention for shooting over the heads of women and children, while
seemingly positive, meant those that were not simply shot on sight would be forced back into the
desert to die slow, painful deaths from starvation, thirst, and exhaustion.42 The government in
Berlin initially supported the measure; however, German Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow
vigorously protested the proclamation and ordered an alternative. On December 5, over two
months after von Trotha issued his policy of annihilation, and after tens of thousands had died in
the desert, Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schliffen ordered von Trotha to pardon
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all Herero and rescind the order.43 Von Trotha begrudgingly complied and the war against the
Herero ended soon after.44
As the war against the Herero wound down in the fall of 1904, the conflict with the Nama
to the south began to heat up. Much like the Herero, the systematic expropriation of Nama tribal
land and cattle and the same sense of an absence of rights underscored the revolt.45 After the
rebellion of the Herero, however, the Nama feared the atrocities committed against their tribal
neighbors to the north would soon be visited upon themselves.46 Hendrik Witbooi, the leader of
the Nama tribe, as early as the 1890s, expressed concerns and sentiments that would, over 12
years later, drive the Nama to take up arms against the Germans. “The White Men’s laws are
quite unbearable and intolerable to us Red [Nama] people: they oppress us and hem us in in all
kinds of ways and on all sides.”47
The prelude to the ensuing violence occurred on August 30, 1904 when Jakob Morenga,
a Nama tribal leader, attacked and defeated a German patrol.48 Then, on October 3, 1904,
Hendrik Witbooi sent a letter to Ludwig Ookopfel stating that he had broken from the
Germans.49 The tribe initially killed a few German settlers, hoping that it would incentivize the
colonizers to move off of their lands. However, in response, the German military sent 15,000
soldiers to fight the estimated 1,000 to 2,000 Nama warriors.50 In the spring of 1905, von Trotha
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headed south to assume command and, in April, he ordered the Nama to unconditionally
surrender. They refused and the war devolved into a guerilla war that would last for 18 months.51
To defeat the Nama, von Trotha instituted a “scorched-earth” policy, burning villages and
granaries. These harsh policies, along with atrocities against the Nama similar to what was seen
with the Herero in the aftermath of the Waterberg, did not end until the fall of 1905. In October
of that year, Hendrik Witbooi was fatally injured during an attempted raid on a German supply
convoy.52 With the death of Hendrik Witbooi, the Nama resistance, now unable to unite around a
central figure, began to break down and soon surrendered.53 The Nama population that was
captured, and survived, were soon deported to concentration camps being built on the coast,
where thousands of their former adversaries—the Herero—had been sent.54 When the conflict
was finally over, and the deaths in the concentration camps had been tallied, 19,000 German
troops had been mobilized and 1,500 had died. That number pales in comparison to the nearly
80,000 people—70,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama— who died in the bloodshed. Before the two
engagements, the tribes’ prewar population totaled around 100,000. 55
At the same time that the Herero and Nama genocide was occurring in Southwest
Africa, in German East Africa another violent campaign against native peoples was underway.
This rebellion was sparked in the southeastern region of the colony, an area settled by the Ngoni
people. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ngoni had migrated to present-day southeastern
Tanzania, due to an upheaval in their native homeland of northeastern South Africa caused by
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environmental crises, the intensification of the slave trade, and the rise of the Zulu nation.56 The
tribe remained a powerful player in their newly-settled homeland until the latter part of the
century.
In 1884, German colonists arrived in East Africa.57 Despite German arrival in the mid1880s, German and Swiss missionaries only began arriving in the region in 1898, with the
German government still not maintaining control over a large portion of the colony.58 In the mid1890s, the Ungoni region—the territory of the Ngoni people—was considered to be one of the
last frontiers of German rule. The year 1896 saw a number of large-scale tribal raids along the
coast of Lake Malawi, and attacks against trade caravans. These actions by the Ngoni challenged
the idea of German supremacy in the colony and called into question Germany’s ability to
protect subjects, as 2,000 captives had been taken during these attacks.59 In response, the
fledgling colony sent a contingent of German troops into the area to show tribes that violence
would not be tolerated.60 The Ngoni people, as well as other tribes in the area, despite German
threats, continued to resist colonial rule. By the dawn of the new century, German East Africa
contained nearly 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 inhabitants, yet only 2,000 of those individuals were
Germans. German authority, therefore, was largely symbolic, upheld though military stations in
the interior.61 With this lack of manpower and control of vital areas, especially in the southeast,
coupled with German intentions of increasing their authority in the area, conflict in East Africa
was inevitable.
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Maji, in Kiswahili, means water; it also can mean war medicine. Maji would become a
key factor in the rebellion in Tanzania. It was through this maji that the seeds of the rebellion in
German East Africa spread.62 The summer of 1905 saw tribal chiefs all over the region face
uncertainty and friction from their tribes over the future, as pressures increased under German
control. Since the colonization of the region, the native tribes had to adapt to a new system of
taxes imposed by the colonial government, the rise of a plantation economy that used native
workers and forced labor for public works projects.63 These hardships led to a religious revival
amongst the tribes of what would become Tanganyika. This revival was led by a prophet named
Kinjikitile Ngwale. Ngwale, a medicine man, offered tribal leaders sacred water which would
release them from the restrictions of existing beliefs and superstitions by giving them a new and
freer life.64 Ngwale’s words spread amongst various tribes in the Southern Highlands of East
Africa, along with the belief that maji could protect tribes from German bullets.65
In late July 1905, men from the Nandete tribe approached their chiefs in a cotton field
which they had been cultivating for the Germans. The two leaders of the Nandete, Ngulumbalyo
Mandi and Lindimyo Machela, subsequently pulled three plants out of the ground, symbolically
declaring war upon the colonizers.66 The Maji Maji Rebellion, as it would be known, began
among the tribes of the southeast, including the Ngoni. The rebellion quickly spread to the
Southern Highlands, and eventually reached the Matabi hills in the central eastern part of the
colony. From there it rapidly spread north, south, northwest, and southwest.67 The rebellion
spread through messengers who carried word of rebellion, along with maji. At first, tribes
Schmidt, “(Re)Negotiating Marginality,” 27.
Hull, Absolute Destruction, 138.
64 Patrick M. Redmond, The Politics of Power in Sonega Ngoni Society, 1860-1962 (Franklin Square, NY: Adams Press, 1985),
118.
65 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 138.
66 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 168.
67 Schmidt, “(Re)Negotiating Marginality,” 41.
62
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attacked German representatives—mainly tax collectors— plus supply caravans and Arab
foreign traders.68 After the symbolic declaration of the rebellion, the Germans immediately sent
additional reinforcements into the region. Colonial Governor Gustav Adolf von Gotzen only had
588 askari (native African soldiers) and 458 “law enforcement officers” in the region when the
uprising began. Gotzen ordered the reinforcement troops to advance into the region; however,
the troops were subjected to frequent ambushes by tribespeople. Lieutenant Lincke, a German
colonial officer on an expedition to Matumbi, reported “that an unusual morale animated the
attackers.”69
The Germans initially attempted to quell the rebellion by destroying its leadership.
Almost immediately after the rebellion began, the shooting of those suspected of being rebel
leaders became military policy. German naval officer von Paasche described such a situation:
At the suggestion of Keudel [a local administrator] Capt. Merker arrived and
proclaimed a state of war so that he could immediately hold a court-martial and
hang three main magicians [rebel leaders], whom Keudel feared might be freed.70
As part of this campaign by the Germans, Ngwale was hanged on August 4. As he
prepared to die, he gave an ominous warning: the medicine had already reached the
Kilosa and Mahenge, districts in central East Africa.71 By July 30, 1905, the rebellious
tribes had sacked German settlements, and on July 31, burned the important trading town
of Samanga. Additionally, on August 13, Ngindo warriors from southern Tanzania
intercepted Benedictine missionaries and shot them dead, as they tried to explain that
they were peaceful.72 News of the killings soon spread north across Rufiji River and into
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the region neighboring Dar es Salaam—the capital of the colony. In this district, the
Zaramo tribe received the maji in late August and rebelled soon after. The rebellion had
reached the doorstep of the colonial government. This, coupled with the burnings of the
villages of Nyangao and Masani in late August and the killings of the Benedictine
missionaries, led the colonial government to take further action.73
These burnings convinced Governor Gotzen that force needed to be used. He sent
limited forces into the interior; however, throughout August, the tribes were able to
defeat and turn back German soldiers.74 In response to these defeats, Governor Gotzen
asked the Reichstag for reinforcements of 150 German soldiers and 600 askari—native
African soldiers. The government refused the request, but sent two cruisers and marines
from China and the Pacific to Dar es Salaam.75
In the late summer and early fall of 1905, the progress of the rebels slowed and grew to a
stalemate as they were defeated in battle and other native tribes did not take maji.76 After a
particularly gruesome battle that saw askari defeated by Ngindo warriors and resulted in the
askaris’ heads being spiked onto flag poles, the Germans formed a force of 60 men to respond to
the violence. After a pitched battle, these 60 German soldiers prevailed, killing 150 adversaries
with their modern weapons.77 Additionally, in late August 1905, another German expedition
travelled to Songea, a town in the southwest. Upon their arrival, the forces of 56 colonial askari
and auxiliaries surprised the local chief as he was handing out maji to 500 warriors who were
armed with spears. In the ensuing battle, 200 warriors were killed; only one colonial soldier was
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killed.78 After these defeats, the tribes began to question the efficacy of the “medicine” that was
meant to protect them from German bullets.
On August 30, 1905, the failure of maji became clear. On that date, 1,200 warriors
advanced on the town of Mahenge, which was occupied by the Germans. The attack on the
village came in three waves: the first was a full-frontal assault against German machine guns,
which resulted in many deaths. The second occurred when warriors, now recognizing the failure
of the maji, broke formation and took cover behind rocks; the third and final wave occurred after
warriors from the Mbunga tribe arrived on September 1. They sent forward a single man while
thousands watched. He was shot and killed soon after.79
The battle at Mahenge exposed the failure of the maji on the battlefield. As a result of the
defeat, the tribes began to revert back to native combat methods. In September 1905, the
Germans began receiving reports of increasing guerilla activity. “Hardly any day passes without
some combat small and large,” a German soldier reported.80 These guerilla activities increased in
frequency, as natives resorted to using traditional weapons.81 On October 21, 1905 the rebellious
tribes blockaded the town of Namabengo in southeastern East Africa. This blockade was lifted
when 200 colonial reinforcements arrived and dispersed the 5,000 warriors with machine guns.82
After the defeat, the warriors all fled in different directions, their intertribal unity broken. This
battle officially marked a shift from the previous tactics of raiding utilized by the tribes to
guerilla-style warfare.83
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Between November 1905 and January 1906 sporadic fighting continued. This began to
decrease as many tribes started to surrender, leaving few pockets of resistance.84 At the same
time, Governor von Gotzen reviewed options to end the rebellion once and for all. The
Waggenhiem report proposed that “only hunger and want can bring about a final submission.
Military action alone will remain more or less a drop in the ocean.”85 In early 1906, Major Kurt
Johannes arrived with fresh reinforcements, and Governor Gotzen, heeding the words of the
Waggenhiem report, began to plan for a new, destructive strategy: famine. Gotzen, after the
arrival of fresh soldiers, proclaimed that the “military leadership has no other alternative than to
use this ally—famine.”86 The Governor immediately instructed the Major to implement a
counterinsurgency campaign which would result in the destruction and confiscation of all food
and supplies and show no mercy to the native population.87
The famine order culminated in the burning of fields and homes during planting seasons;
the holding of women and children hostage to get rebellious male warriors to surrender; and the
captured warriors being assigned to forced labor, with tribal leaders being executed.88 A German
captain, Richter, commenting on the policy of famine: “That’s right, the fellows can just
starve…If I could I would even prevent them from planting anything. This is the only way we
can make the fellows sick of war.”89 Furthermore, a military report from the commander of the
German naval forces in East Africa stated that the rebels would be forced “to a lasting
capitulation through permanent harassment, destruction of their villages, and removal of
livestock and food stores.”90 As the famine strategy wore on, former militants reported that
84

Redmond, The Politics of Power, 130.
Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 193.
86
Gwassa, The Outbreak and Development, 198.
87 Schmidt, “(Re)Negotiating Marginality,” 43.
88 Ibid.
89 Gwassa, The Outbreak and Development, 193.
90 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 156.
85

17

conditions amongst the tribes had become dire. One warrior said, “We had no stronghold, no
place to stay in to do this or that.” Hunger further affected the native war effort, as warriors
became more focused on finding food than fighting. In one instance, an ambush was averted by
German soldiers when tribal warriors went out to pick bananas on the side of the road and were
spotted.91 The “scorched-earth” campaign finally ended the rebellion in 1907. The two-year
rebellion and subsequent famine devastated the whole southern part of the colony and led to an
estimated 250,000 to 300,000 deaths, around one-third of the total population of the region.92
Meanwhile, the death toll for the colonial government stood at 15 German soldiers, 73 askari,
and 215 auxiliaries.93
Connections to the Holocaust
These two tragedies occurred over 100 years ago; however, in recent years, the rebellion
of the Herero and Nama in Namibia has become much more prominent. One of the reasons of
this renewed interest is the rebellions’ structural and personal connections to the Holocaust. One
simple connection is that both of these events were genocides; the Herero and Nama event now
being considered the first genocide of the twentieth century. Characteristics of the genocide in
Southwest Africa included the willingness and acceptance of mass death—by colonial officials
like Governor Leutewin and General von Trotha, the destruction of native culture, and extremist
language from the Germans. Comparatively, in the German East African rebellions, while the
numbers of dead were substantially higher - 250,000 in German East Africa compared to 80,000
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in Southwest Africa, there is no evidence in German East Africa that the military or colonial
officials in the colony willingly sought the destruction of the 30 tribes in active rebellion.
An acceptance of mass casualties was established early after the rebellion of the Herero
had begun in 1905. After being questioned by the Director of the Colonial Department Dr. Oskar
Stuebel on the nature of the fighting, Governor von Leutwein said, “It is only natural, however,
that after all that has happened to our soldiers [they] do not show excessive leniency.”94 When it
came to dealing with the Nama, the Germans resorted to using cruel and violent tactics in
pursuing a small band of Nama renegades led by Joseph Morenga. A colonist, Richard Denker,
reported that German troops had captured 50 women and 38 children and, lacking proper
transport to prison facilities and having gotten no useful information from them, the colonial
soldiers shot all of them. Upon seeing this tragedy, Denker reportedly said, “I am ashamed to be
a German.”95 After von Trotha issued his annihilation order, which showed an intent to destroy
the Herero as an ethnic group, he issued the additional order regarding women and children,
ordering that soldiers shoot over their heads in order to scare them off. However, when prisoners
began to be captured, von Trotha issued yet another, more chilling, order regarding women and
children. In a letter of von Schlieffen on October 4, 1904, von Trotha stated the new measures
put in place to prevent the capture of prisoners.
Accepting women and children who are ill pose an imminent danger to the
troops…Therefore, I think it better the nation perish rather than infect our troops
and affect our water and food.96
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Thus, Von Trotha justified the deaths of unarmed women and children because they posed a
potential threat to the health of his soldiers. At this point in the rebellion, after the battle of the
Waterberg and the desert pursuit, he saw extermination, not surrender, as the only way forward.97
The openness of using tactics that caused mass death was one that led to the physical
extermination of tens of thousands of Herero and Nama people; however, the conflict also saw
the destruction of tribal culture. Herero tribal lands were a place where “places of meaning” such
as graves, waterholes, and events of historical significance took place.98 The Herero viewed the
land as a place where memories and meaning were inscribed on the land itself from previous
generations, acting as mnemonic devices for cultural history and identity.99 However, during the
era of German colonialism, the land was lost by means of physical and cultural expropriation.
Germans renamed the Herero’s sacred and significant places, thus these places lost their
significant cultural meanings. Additionally, the destruction of Herero villages and the restriction,
or outright banning, of the Herero cultural traditions of owning cattle and pastoral nomadism
destroyed activities central to the tribe’s cultural and socio-economic traditions.100 The Germans
also executed, or killed in battle, nearly all of the Herero chieftainship and deported their
surviving family members. These chiefs represented a cornerstone of Herero society and cultural
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tradition.101 The deaths of the whole tribal leadership significantly weakened the group’s
economic, political, and social institutions.102
This intentional annihilation and genocide of a people was further propagated by
concentration camps, similar to those utilized in the genocide carried out by the Third Reich
nearly 40 years later. As the campaign against the Herero continued into 1905, the establishment
of prisoner-of-war camps became a military necessity. While small, temporary prison camps had
been in use since the winter of 1904, the spring of 1905 saw the establishment of four main
concentration camps to hold tribal prisoners: Windhoek, Shark Island, Okahandja, and
Swakopmund.103 When captured, Herero and Nama prisoners automatically fell under the
military authority of area commanders who were responsible for caring for the prisoners under
their control. At a time when many German soldiers lacked basic supplies, this proved to be a
difficult responsibility. In January 1905, General von Trotha issued guidance regarding the
treatment of prisoners, which stated that priority would be given to the needs of his own troops,
and that the needs of the tribal prisoners would be addressed only after military needs had been
satisfied.104 This rigid maintenance of military policy regarding provisioning would have
disastrous consequences for the Herero and Nama captured and imprisoned for the next three
years.
Eventually, this guidance devolved from prisoners not taking priority, to active
mistreatment, cruelty, torture, rape and countless deaths in concentration camps. As the war
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progressed, many thousands of tribespeople would meet similar fates in the concentration camps.
After taking command over the Herero revolt, General von Trotha established principles for
imprisonment that defined how prisoners-of-war were treated in the concentration camps. Under
these policies, the local officer capturing the prisoners would be given the authority to determine
how to transport them; security was to be kept at an absolute minimum, necessitating the usage
of chains and other inhumane devices; and the Herero were to be kept visibly and permanently
identified with tin passes around their necks.105 Nama prisoners were originally meant to be
deported to the German colonies of Somoa and Adamauna, as Colonel von Deimling, the
commander of the German Schutztruppe, German soldiers in the colony, believed the tribe posed
a greater security risk than the Herero due to the recent escape of the surviving Witbooi soldiers
from custody.106 However, the high cost of transport killed this idea of deportation and instead
the Nama were to be sent to prison camps along the coast, mainly Shark Island.107
Many prisoners, upon their capture, were taken to collection camps where they were
sorted by their level of health. The sick were sent to concentration camps while the healthier
individuals were sent to labor camps.108 However, even transporting prisoners proved to be a
major problem. The German government had refused to subsidize the costs of prisoners due to
their belief, much like von Trotha’s, that military resources should not be burdened by caring for
prisoners. The government did institute a tax to help pay for prisoner costs; however, its effects
were negligible.109 This ideology had tragic consequences. Benjamin Burger, a Dutch South
African serving as a guide for the Schutztruppe, bore witness to the surprise attack and
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subsequent capture of Nama prisoners. German soldiers, Burger said, had found a group of 13
women and elderly men in a cave and ordered them to come out and surrender. As they came
out, the Germans shot all of them as they exited. The commanding officer in charge ordered the
deaths of these prisoners in order to avoid having to escort them back to a holding camp and
wasting time and resources in the process.110
By April 1905, the colonial government was in possession of 4,000 prisoners, a number
that would balloon to 13,216 by December of that year.111 The locations of the concentration
camps at Shark Island, Swakopmund, and Windhoek, made death an easy proposition for
arriving prisoners. The commanders of these prison camps had been given orders that they were
not to help the sick upon arrival, only those able-bodied and healthy, so labor could be supplied
for the various infrastructure projects in the colony.112 Missionary Heinrich Ledder visited the
camp at Swakopmund in early March 1905 and was shocked at the conditions. The camp was
located along the coast and, during the months of April to October, was subjected to cold, harsh
winds whipping off the sea. He said of the occupants, “Some of them had been starved to
skeletons…In the settlements they were placed into big kraals [huts]…without blankets, and
some without clothing.”113 The prisoners at the camp were crammed 30 to 40 into simple huts
made from sticks with simple canvas cloth roofs that did little to protect them from the winds.
Supplies, due to von Trotha’s distaste at allocating military resources for prisoners, were
extremely scarce at the camp. Ledder reported that there were only 80 blankets to protect the
over 1,200 people imprisoned at the camp. He also reported that the prisoners could not eat
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sufficiently since they had no cookware to cook the uncooked rice they were allotted.114 Henry
Francis Walker, upon visiting the remains of the camp 10 years later, would describe it as having
“the most miserable habitations imaginable.”115 Medical facilities at the camp, while officially
provided, were relegated to a cramped space located near animal stables and sewage lines. 116 The
two prison camps at Windhoek held over 5,000 prisoners by mid-August 1906. These two
camps, as with Swakopmund, were very small and had frequent, deadly outbreaks of disease
epidemics. These two camps used barbed-wire or thick bushels of thorn bushes to keep prisoners
contained in these small spaces.117
It was the concentration camp at Luderitz Bay, located on the aptly named Shark Island,
which would become infamous for its suffering. The camp, established in March 1905, was
where many Herero and nearly all captured Nama were sent. Located on the northern tip of the
island, the camp was exposed to the cold winds and weather from the South Atlantic at their
most extreme.118 The environment proved fatal for many prisoners-of-war. The Herero and
Nama peoples had historically been located inland, away from the coast, for much of their
existence, and many tribespeople had never set foot near the coast during their entire lives. Their
bodies were not acclimated to cold climates, only that of the dry, warm interior of the colony.119
Additionally, Shark Island contained no actual buildings, with prisoners being given a few
surplus, or broken, military tents, and others making shelters with spare blankets to protect them
from the constant wind.120
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General Lothar von Trotha’s continual resistance to allocate more money to the camps
had a particularly devastating effect at Shark Island. From September to December 1906, of the
1,795 Herero and Nama imprisoned at the camp, 1,032 would die of exposure, disease, or
starvation.121 In December 1906, after the death of 276 of the 1,464 Nama that month, the
commander of the camp, Colonel Deimling, received numerous complaints from missionaries
regarding the horrid conditions of the prisoners. After asking the commandant to remove the
women and children from the camp in order to save their lives, Deimling jokingly replied, “It
hadn’t occurred to me that there are actually more women than men in there.”122 The large
female population at the camp led to many instances of German soldiers sexually assaulting and
raping female prisoners. Many of these rapes went unreported and were not taken to court, with
few exceptions.123
Lack of and contaminated food became a common source of death amongst the Nama
located on Shark Island. The ideal daily nutritional intake for prisoners was 1,190 calories, which
was frequently adjusted downward and given only when available.124 With rations consisting
mainly of grains, rice and flour, many of the prisoners had no idea how to prepare or cook such
foods. This forced diet of high fiber foods contrasted, many times fatally, with the traditional diet
of milk and meat that tribal people were accustomed to consuming from their large stocks of
cattle.125 Edward Fredricks, the son of Chief Joseph Fredericks, the leader of the Bethany Nama
tribe, was captured and sent to Shark Island as a prisoner. He described being beaten daily by
Germans with sjamboks—leather whips—and women being violated by German guards on a
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regular basis. Fredericks tallies the number of his tribespeople who died on Shark Island at 168
males, 97 women, and 66 children.126 Fritz Issac, another prisoner of the camp on Shark Island,
mentioned that of the 3,500-member prisoner party he was sent with, only 193 survived the first
year on Shark Island; over 3,300 had died.127
A 1908 report from the Schutzruppe Command showed that a total of 17,000 Herero and
Nama were taken as prisoners-of-war between 1904 and 1907. Out of this total, the report
estimates that 7,682 of those imprisoned, 45 percent, died. However, modern scholars consider
those numbers to be inaccurate and estimate the following numbers are more precise: 33,000
tribespeople were taken prisoner and 17,000 or 51 percent, died in the camps.128 In total, owing
to a spike in mortality rates in 1906, 61 percent of prisoners at the two camps in Windhoek did
not survive imprisonment. At the Okahandja camp, the death rate was lower, at 37 percent.
However, the camps at Swakopmund and Shark Island became places of death for Herero and
Nama prisoners sent to them. At Swakopmund, between 1904 and 1907, 74 percent of prisoners
died. Those numbers would be superseded by the dead at Shark Island: 86 percent of the Herero
prisoners and 223% of the total Nama prisoners died on the small island of rock in Lüderitz
Bay.129
In addition to the intent to target and annihilate ethnic groups and the use of
concentration camps, extremist language and institutionalized racism marked the third aspect of
the genocide in Namibia that connects it, structurally, to the Aryan race rhetoric of the Nazis in
the 1930s and 1940s. After the rebellion had begun in 1904, false reports of barbaric atrocities
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committed by the Herero began to be reported in newspapers around the world. News
organizations in Germany widely reported stories of German soldiers being gruesomely killed by
savage tribespeople, which were also reprinted in the United States. The New York Independent
reported in February 1904 that families caught on farms had been horribly slain, including
cannibalization, and that captured soldiers were being tortured and buried alive by the marauding
bands of Herero warriors.130 These false claims increased the violence visited upon the Herero
warriors and prisoners, and also may explain German atrocities and acceptance of mass death
and the inherent institutionalized racism as well.
The year 1905 saw the passage of a law banning rassenmischung, race-mixing, in the
colony. The law in Namibia was a catalyst for similar laws in German East Africa the following
year and Samoa seven years later.131 The race laws of German Southwest Africa provided a
conceptual basis that would later be applied by Nazi lawmakers to draft the 1935 Defense Law,
which prohibited soldiers from marrying non-Aryan peoples, as well as the infamous Nuremberg
Laws.132 Furthermore, in 1908, after the end of the Herero and Nama revolts, legislation ordered
that all Africans over the age of eight-years-old had to wear tin passes embroidered with the
imperial crown, district area, and labor number.133 These tin passes bear a resemblance to the
identification patches worn by victims of the Holocaust four decades later.
Extreme language also permeated the conflict in the colony. As has already been seen,
members of the colonial government used extremist language when referring to their policy
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goals or their thoughts on the native peoples. General von Trotha, before arriving in the colony,
used Social Darwinism to explain his racist feelings regarding the Herero: “At the onset we
cannot do without the natives. But they will finally have to melt away…philanthropic views
cannot banish Darwin’s law survival of the fittest.” 134 In 1906, Captain Maximillian Rayer said
that God ordained the destruction of the Nama. A year later, government official Paul Rohrbach
argued that the Nama had no use economically, like the Herero had; therefore there was “no
justification for the preservation of this race.”135
Medical experimentation in the prisoner-of-war camps of Southwest Africa is also yet
another structural link between Namibia and Nazi Germany. At the camp on Shark Island, the
camp’s doctor, Dr. Bofiger, attempted to find the source of the high death rate amongst
prisoners, as well as try to cure scurvy in the camp. To attempt this, the doctor performed a
number of experiments on live prison subjects in which he injected them with various
substances, including arsenic and opium, to find a cure— which he never did.136 There were also
reports that Herero prisoners were forcibly sterilized and injected with doses of smallpox,
typhus, and tuberculosis.137 Eugen Fischer, a German anthropologist who became an influential
figure for race science, developed and tested racial hygiene theories in Southwest Africa. Using
captured prisoners as experiments, Fischer tested, and subsequently allegedly confirmed, using
physical measurements, his theories that genetic racial mixing between Germans and Africans
was dangerous.138
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The structural connections between the Herero and Nama genocide and the Holocaust are
striking: intent to annihilate, concentration camps, extremist language and institutionalized
racism, and medical experiments on live prisoners; however, within the past decade, a literature
has formed linking these events in Namibia at the turn of the twentieth century to the Holocaust
by way of individual, personal connections. In the aftermath of both the Herero and Nama
rebellions, as well as World War I, and during the socialist uprisings in Germany in the 1920s,
many veterans of the colonial wars formed Freikorps—free army—units to fight against socialist
groups.139 General Ludwig von Maercer, having served in German Southwest Africa and having
overseen prisoners at Shark Island, formed the first Freikorps unit to crush the revolutionary
uprising in Munich.140 Several men who would become influential in the Third Reich held
positions in the unit, including a young Reinhard Heydrich.141 Other influential members of the
future Nazi regime included Paul Emil von Lettowvorbek, Franz Ritter von Epp, Eugen Fischer,
and Herman Goering.
Paul Emil von Lettowvorbeck, a veteran of the war in Namibia, formed his own
Freikorps unit and suppressed the Communists in Berlin during the violence in 1919.
Lettowvorbeck served at the battle of the Waterberg alongside another future Nazi, Franz Xavier
Ritter von Epp. Members that served in Lettowvorbeck’s unit included Wilhelm Stukart, who
would go on to become a Nazi lawyer who would draft the Nuremberg Laws. Lettowvorbeck’s
aide-de-camp was Ernst Rohm, Hitler’s future right-hand-man and driving force behind the Nazi
Brown Shirts.142
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Franz Xavier Ritter von Epp arrived in Southwest Africa in 1904 as one of the first
reinforcements sent to put down the revolt, holding the position as a company commander. He
fought at the Waterberg and was stationed in the colony until 1906.143 After World War I, von
Epp became commander of the Bavarian Freikorps, who generally despised the Weimar
Republic and wanted the reestablishment of the monarchy.144 During this time, after World War
I, von Epp became acquainted with Adolf Hitler, installing him as an “educator” in his Freikorps
unit.145 Von Epp subsequently became a member of the Nazi party and on March 9, 1933, von
Epp was appointed as a Reich commissioner, on orders from Hitler, to take over the government
in Munich.146
As discussed earlier, Eugen Fischer was an influential anthropologist in German
Southwest Africa during the revolt of the Herero and Nama. During his time in Namibia, Fischer
studied the Baster people. The Basters were a mixed- race tribe, descended from Nama women
and Boer men, who lived in a community named Rehoboth. Fischer studied them to show how
race-mixing led to degeneration of the white race over time. He did this by measuring lengths of
extremities and heads of Baster people.147 His report, “The Rehobeth Bastards and the
Basterization Problem in Man,” contained photographs and charts of eyes and hair color to argue
the problems of race-mixing.148 He subsequently released a joint report entitled “Human
Heredity and Racial Hygiene.” This study would go on to become the most influential book on
Nazi race science.149 One of the anthropologist’s most prominent students was Joseph
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Mengele.150 Adolf Hitler personally received a copy of Fischer’s report while imprisoned in
Landsburg, where it played a significant role in shaping his views of race and racial purity.151
Fischer later became director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology from 1927-1942
152

and would later become a powerful figure in Nazi racial science during the Third Reich.153

Under Nazi rule, the anthropologist became a judge on the Superior German Health Court, which
sought to perform studies using black Africans for purposes of exploitation.154
The final, and perhaps most significant Nazi with connections to the events in Namibia in
1904-08, was Herman Goering. Goering’s father, Heinrich, served as the Reichkommissionar of
Southwest Africa between 1884-1891, where he suppressed small revolts and signed treaties that
subdued African peoples.155 Herman Goering, his son, held his father’s service in Africa in high
regard, saying that it is how he learned that the subjugation of non-Germans was a patriotic path
to glory.156 Herman Goering’s official Nazi party biography claimed that his father, and his
action against the Herero, influenced his son’s character.157 The Third Reich opened a museum
to Herman Goering in 1940 as a memorial to Germany’s lost empire. This memorial included
various exhibition halls that contained, among other things, the Nazi flag alongside the flag of
the Second Reich—the era of the Herero and Nama—and a large portrait of Hitler next to Alfred
Lüderitz, the founder of German Southwest Africa.158
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Human Remains
The Holocaust had made it possible for anthropologists to acquire body parts from Nazi
concentration camps, continuing a process that had begun in Southwest Africa.159 With
connections to individuals performing medical experiments, like Eugen Fischer, who would go
on to become an influential Nazi member, the Herero and Nama genocide has become a
“globalized” event, as the physical remains of those who died proliferated around the world.
After the war against the Herero ended in December 1905, Lt. Ralf Zurn, who was a prominent
individual in starting the war, was asked by anthropologist Felix von Luschan to bring back
skulls of dead prisoners to Germany.160 Reports from Germans involved in the process say that
Herero women were forced to remove the heads of their countrymen with shards of broken
glass.161 Zoologist Leonard Schultz, on a collecting trip in the colony, said: “I could make use of
the victims of war… from fresh native corpses, which made a welcome addition to the study of
the living body.”162 These skulls found their ways into the United States and Germany, leading to
the Herero and Nama genocide becoming more well-known internationally than the events in
East Africa. At the American Museum of Natural History in New York City, boxes of human
skulls and bones remain stored inside the building after Luschan sold his entire private collection
to the museum.163 These skulls also found their way into the Medical History Museum of the
Charite hospital in Berlin, which has become a recent center of controversy regarding the
repatriation of skulls back to Namibia. Since 2008, 20 skulls have been returned to the country so
far.164 The spread of human remains around the world was a unique characteristic of the tragedy
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in Namibia, one not seen in the aftermath of the Maji Maji uprising in East Africa, and it led to
increasing awareness of the genocide in Southwest Africa, in both Germany and the United
States, as calls for repatriation grew in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Political Power: Loss in Tanzania
The proliferation of human remains globalized the destruction of the Herero and Nama in
a way that was not seen with the tribes of East Africa. While both tribes in Namibia would be
repressed in the aftermath of the conflict, the tribes, particularly the Herero, would experience a
resurgence of political, social, and economic power; however, the same cannot be said of the 30
tribes that participated in the Maji Maji Uprising in 1905. The memory of that rebellion has
faded for public view, just as the Herero and Nama genocide had until the past two decades. This
was due to political events that sought to not only destroy tribal political power but the very
identity of the rebellion itself: the concept of maji.
German, and later British, officials saw the cornerstone of the revolt in East Africa, maji,
as a dangerous form of spiritual and medicinal practice they associated with demonic forces and
witchcraft. Therefore, after the rebellion, colonial officials believed that witchcraft had the
potential to lead to another rebellion. Prior to the uprising in 1905, medicinal magic, which
would soon be termed witchcraft by the Europeans, was practiced by over 100 tribes in the
region.165 After the rebellion, German officials believed that the waganaga, healers, who
mobilized villages in a specific region—like what was seen in Maji Maji—could once again
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threaten the colonial administration with violence.166 To the German colonial government, the
medicine practiced by these tribes was of a political nature.
After World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, the region of East Africa, now known
as Tanganyika, came under the control of the British government. With the changing of
government, however, the policy towards witchcraft remained unchanged.167 Initially, the British
colonial government distributed pamphlets regarding the use of witchcraft. These pamphlets did
not treat witchcraft as a crime, however. Circular No. 15 of April 1919 treated witchcraft as a
superficial threat, but warned that “the fact should not be lost sight of that witchcraft possessed
in the past of this country, and still possess possibilities for evil as an incitement to native
uprisings.”168 This was a clear reference to the Maji Maji rebellion a decade prior. A later
regulatory pamphlet, Circular No.22, still did not impose punishment for witchcraft, except
during specific cases of riot incitement.169
Not until the coming of the first British colonial governor of Tanganyika, Horace Byatt,
were laws established that punished individuals for practicing witchcraft. The law passed in
1922, during his tenure as governor, was officially titled, “Ordinance to Provide for the
Punishment of Persons Practicing Witchcraft or Making Use of So Called Witchcraft.” While the
law was more expansive than Circular No. 22, covering not just witchcraft used for riot
incitement, but any form of witchcraft used with “malicious intent,” it still did not ban outright
the practice of tribal healing.170
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After Governor Byatt left colonial office in 1922, the incoming Governor of Tanganyika,
Donald Cameron, proclaimed a major change in the laws regarding witchcraft. Cameron believed
that the previous witchcraft law of 1922 was useless and set about redefining colonial ordinance
by expanding and enlarging the scope of punishments for the practice of witchcraft.171 In 1928,
his administration released a new law that made all practice of witchcraft illegal. The Witchcraft
Act of December 1928 defined witchcraft to include “sorcery, enchantment, and bewitching.”
According to the law, an individual was guilty of a crime if they had instruments of witchcraft in
their possession, had a statement of intent to commit acts of magic, supplied others with
instruments of witchcraft, advised others on performing the act, or threatened the use of
magic.172 The punishment for violating the law depended on malicious intent. If a person
performed witchcraft without malice, they were fined 1,000 shillings; if caught performing the
act with malicious intent, the punishment was imprisonment for seven years and a 4,000 shilling
fine.173
Under British administration, tribal magic was repressed with ruthless efficiency; the
memory of the rebellion faded as the supernatural beliefs and practices that defined it crumbled
under increasing colonial scrutiny. The tribes that once practiced such spiritual practices, and
spearheaded the rebellion in East Africa were accused by many in the government of greed,
envy, and savage cannibalism.174 These collective groups of peoples, once proud and prominent
tribes in the region, had become, in the eyes of the colonizers, inhuman demons. In the southern
part of Tanganyika, witchcraft was openly met with violence.

171

Ibid., 59.
The Witchcraft Act, Ord. No. 45 of 1956.2 (1928). The law defines instruments of witchcraft as anything that is used to
prevent or delay any person from doing any act a person may lawfully perform.
173 Mesaki, “Witchcraft and the law in Tanzania,” 134.
174 Langwick, Bodies, Politics, and Africa, 373.
172

35

These laws, and actions, against supposed witchcraft would continue well into the
twentieth century. In the 1950s, the government of Tanganyika pushed for more stringent
witchcraft eradication methods. In 1954, local town councils were instructed to cleanse districts
of witchcraft and witches. These actions resulted in the “cure” of 704 people with medicines or
the surrender of their magical instruments.175 The year 1956 saw a revision of the 1928
Witchcraft Act. The revision created an official commission to review and asses the state of
witchcraft in the territory. This committee approved a number of measures, including a vigorous
educational strategy through law and propaganda, with the intention that such education, and
spread of modern ideas, would marginalize and end beliefs in witchcraft; the committee also
allowed for more cleansing actions in some areas of the colony.176
In 1961, the former colony of Tanganyika declared independence and became the
Republic of Tanzania. Despite independence, the new government of Tanzania, led by Julius
Nyerere, did not alter its stance towards witchcraft in the country. The central government and
Christian and Muslim leaders still did not sanction witchcraft in Tanzania.177 A law passed in
1965 defined witchcraft to include “sorcery, enchantment, bewitching, the use of instruments of
witchcraft, the purported exercise of occult power, and the purported possession of any occult
knowledge.”178 This new law parroted many aspects of the 1928 colonial law regarding
witchcraft, but expanded the scope of punishment and the circumstances by which a person
would be committing witchcraft.179
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The 1970s saw a radical period in the suppression of witchcraft in Tanzania. This era saw
the federal government institute Operation Mauaji, which rounded up and interrogated nearly
900 people suspected of being witches and performing witchcraft.180 The 1970s also saw the
creation of local vigilante organizations to fight against witchcraft: the Sungusungu. The
Sungusungu were formed in the late 1970s with support from the central government at the end
of the Ugandan War of 1979.181 The official goal of this group was the re-establishment of
tranquility in villages by decreasing crime and the eradication of witches.182 These groups,
particularly in the southern Tanzania, used violence to eradicate witchcraft , often killing the
elderly, females, and vulnerable individuals.183 Between 1970 and 1984, there were an estimated
3,333 witch-related cases of murders that killed 3,692 people.184 These groups continued to grow
and increase their violent activity throughout the 1980s, which led to a contentious debate over
witchcraft in the 1990s. This debate came to an end at the dawn of the twenty-first century, with
the passage of the 2002 Witchcraft Act, which continued many of the existing provisions and
laws from both the 1928 and 1956 laws banning witchcraft.185
In contemporary Tanzania, the repression of supposed witches and witchcraft is still an
important concern to the federal government. At present, Tanzania is reluctant, according to the
World Health Organization, to acknowledge that witchcraft still exists in the country.186 While
the government has made progress in recent years in combatting witch-killings, maintaining that
they are illegal and subject to a fine and imprisonment, many officials within local councils
continue to support the activities of the Sungusungu, and view these actions as pursuing justice
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or ridding an area of bad luck.187 The central government itself has come under renewed fire for
actively supporting vigilante activities that kill innocent people suspected of being witches.188
The persecution of suspected witches has not appeared to slow in recent years as people with
albinism have been killed at increasing rates, and dismembered, because doctors argue such body
parts are valuable. As recently as 2011, 600 elderly women were killed in Tanzania on suspicion
that they were witches.189
As witchcraft eradication increased over time, the Maji Maji rebellion faded from public
view, as its core characteristics, healers and maji, have been deemed witchcraft. During the
1960s, the uprising was trumpeted by many politicians as a nation-building experience, the first
event to unite the separate tribes in the area to achieve a common goal; however, as the decades
have passed, this narrative of the Maji Maji rebellion, one where tribal, ethnic, and religious
differences did not matter, was proven incorrect by scholars who, studying the evidence, argued
that the revolt was indeed a tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict.
During the push for Namibian independence, many political leaders in Tanganyika
argued that the Maji Maji rebellion was the first example of tribes coming together and
exhibiting their national unity. This was spurred by a nationalistic interpretation that emphasized
the strong positive resistance amongst tribes against the German government.190 In a speech at
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the United Nations, future Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere voiced these common sentiments
at the time:

The people fought because they did not believe in the white man’s right to
govern and civilize the black. They rose in a great rebellion not through fear of a
terrorist movement or superstitious oath, but in response to a natural call of the
spirit, ringing in the hearts of all men, and all times, educated or uneducated, to
rebel against foreign domination.191

Although the rebellion was widespread throughout the colony, not every locality or tribe
participated.192 The cause of the rebellion was not, according to historians, a result of German
oppression, but one of economic power. The geographic spread of the rebellion strongly
coincided with tribal divisions between trading networks, with tribes centered on a network
usually joining the rebellion.193
The Maji Maji was sanctified and extended by religious ideology, particularly by the
Kolelo cult. This cult, run by ministers, interpreted the orders to rebel as having come from the
heavens, who then brought these orders and grievances to regular tribespeople.194 The Kolelo
cult, which had widespread influence over southern Tanzania, was centered in the village of
Ngarambi on the Rufiji River, and saw many people flock to them from many parts, particularly
from the south and east, to seek advice and help.195 The cult was also centered in other areas, and
as a result, provided teachings and instructions to many tribespeople. The Kolelo cult provided a
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mechanism to reach the people along the Rufiji river.196 Another aspect of the religious character
of the Maji Maji movement, disputed by the Tanzanian government, was the prophet Kinjikitile
Ngwale, who effectively turned maji into war medicine, giving the spiritual water a new
ideological meaning related to war.197
As religion was a catalyst for the rebellion, tribalization directed action during the latter
stages of the uprising. As the rebellion entered its second year and progress slowed, many tribes
recognized the failure of the maji to protect them from the Germans. An example of this
tribalization was seen in two tribes: the Vidunda and Ngoni. A hongo, a priest, came to the
Vidunda tribe and informed its members that he was there to free them from European control.
Tribespeople listened to the priest’s word, over the calls of their chief, Ngwira, and accepted the
maji and rebelled. The hongo took control of the tribe and increased his power within the district,
gathering warriors to fight against the Germans. After gathering warriors, he fought, and lost, a
battle against the colonizers. The warriors soon returned to their tribe and chief, returning to old
tribal guerilla fighting methods after their loss.198 The Ngoni tribe, at the outbreak of the
rebellion was divided between northern and southern sections. After both sections accepted the
maji and rebelled, they operated independently of each other, within the limits of their kinship
and tribal structures.199
As the contradictory narratives of the Maji Maji rebellion have led to its isolation from
political speeches, with mentions of it seemingly only occurring during the annual anniversary of
its beginning, the loss of tribal political power in the country has given few tribes the ability to
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voice their stories and push for popular memorialization of the uprising. To illustrate the
correlation between the loss of tribal power and the lack of remembrance, compared to the
Herero and Nama, focus will be put on the largest, and one of the most influential tribes in the
region, the Ngoni. When European settlers arrived in the region in the late nineteenth century,
the Ngoni tribe in the southwestern region of Sonega, were regarded as a tribe of disciplined and
fearless warriors. This sentiment was based on their authoritarian society, structured settlement
pattern, and positive agricultural performance. Europeans viewed these as positive institutions
and good values of discipline, strength, and order. Initially, German missionaries believed that
Ngoni society offered the possibility for other tribes to reject the barbaric elements and to
civilize them.200
The Ngoni, however, were one of the initial tribes to rebel against the Germans in 1905
and participated throughout. However, as the Germans systematically cracked down on the
tribe’s food production, its fighting began to wane. In 1906, the Germans captured and hanged
nearly one hundred Ngoni elite and deported others as forced labor to the coast.201 The repression
of the rebellion had effectively destroyed the old chieftain system of the Ngoni tribe and the
population fell by up to one-half—from a pre-war population of 60,000 to 30,000 after 1907.202
After the Germans were forced out of the region after World War I, and East Africa came under
a British mandate, the colonial government continued to control the formerly strong tribe by
taking control of its lands away from the chiefs.203
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By the 1950s, the positive attitude once held towards the Ngoni tribe by German
missionaries in the early twentieth century had begun to shift and transform. Under British
control, the Ngoni were now viewed as lazy, undisciplined, backward, and non-progressive.204 In
1954, the historian P.A. Gulliver described the stagnation of Ngoni life:
Whether one surveys their agriculture, their housing, their diet, their standards of
life or their ceremonial, one finds only a depressing poverty of ideas, ambition
and an equally depressing resignation to its perpetuation.205

Policies initiated by the British government in the mid-1940s began a process of resettlement that
was to continue for the next four decades and had a profound effect on tribal power and the
memory of the Maji Maji Uprising. The 1930s saw the colonial government institute a land
policy in the Liwale region in southeast Tanganyika that favored nature over villages, with a goal
of reducing tribal power and the risk of rebellion. This led to the movement of dozens of villages
and the subsequent creation of the Selous Game Reserve in 1947.206
After independence in 1961, Julius Nyerere commenced a nationwide villagization
program as rural development took center-stage in an effort to modernize.207 In 1961, the Ngoni
people formed the Ruvuma Development Association with the intention of developing cottage
industries like wool, masonry, carpentry, and soap-making. This society was initially heralded as
a government success, but soon developed strong opposition within its ranks. In September 1969,
the government disbanded the association, confiscated their assets, and no longer allowed the
tribe to assert its autonomy.208
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In 1967, the Arusha Declaration saw the state assert increased control over agricultural
production, which was soon followed by Operation Villagization.209 It was during this
villagization period in the 1960s and 1970s that tribes from the south, in particular, were forcibly
moved and forced to resettle in nearly 7,000 newly-created villages. This resettlement program
led to the abandonment of traditional methods of farming and tribal ways of life 210 With
President Nyerere ordering that all people were to live in villages by 1976, state control
increased exponentially over rural areas and peoples, like the Ngoni.211 By the mid-1970s, the
once prominent Ngoni had been forcibly resettled, with political power stripped from their
control.
The effects of this eradication and the reduction of tribal political power through forced
villagization, along with the criminalization of witchcraft is reflected in how the Maji Maji
rebellion is remembered and memorialized in contemporary Tanzania. Within the southern
region where the war occurred, many people, even those descended from individuals who
experienced the war first hand, are not knowledgeable about it. In interviews with tribespeople,
many appeared to not know of the suffering that their ancestors went through. Speaking with an
81-year-old man, historian Heike Schmidt discovered that the man was not told about the
experience of his people and assumed that his people did not go hungry when the opposite was
true.212 Another female individual stated that she did not know anything whatsoever about how
her parents experienced the war, or anything about the war for that matter.213
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In the present day, many of the people living within what is referred to as the “Maji Maji
Zone” somewhat know about the war and have a limited understanding of the tribes that
participated in the rebellion. However, people outside of this zone do not have the same level of
understanding of the rebellion, if at all, or of the cultural history of the tribes involved.214 When
it comes to memorialization of the rebellion, there exist only two nationally recognized
monuments: one in Sonega and the other in Nandate.215 Additionally, remembrance of the
rebellion takes place on one day, February 27, and occurs in only one area of the country,
Ungoni, where the Sonega memorial is located. The day is dedicated to the 68 warriors who were
executed by Germans on that day in 1905.216
Political Power: Revival in Namibia
As the Ngoni tribe lost its political power and its land, the memory of the Maji Maji
faded from the minds of Tanzanians. In Namibia, however, the Herero people, nearly decimated
after the end of the rebellion in 1907, would experience a transformation in their political, and
cultural power; this transformation would see them spearhead remembrance and reparations for
the genocide around the globe.
After the end of the Namibia rebellion and before the First World War, many of the
surviving Herero were used as forced labor on plantations and public infrastructure projects.
During the military campaign in Southwest Africa in 1915, many Herero men deserted in masse
from their places of forced employment and sided with the British forces.217 After the British
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victory in the region in 1916, many of the Herero were freed from their forced labor. 218 The
Herero, now free from their laborious tasks, began to re-establish a major tenet of their culture—
cattle farming—which was formerly restricted and made illegal by the Germans.219 With the
reestablishment of cattle farming, Herero survivors began to settle, many times illegally, on
former lands that had been lost after German settlement in the region. The Herero began to
reoccupy lands to such an extent that the tribe created a new leadership, and the English/South
African administration was forced to recognize its legitimacy, as well as the right of the tribe to
own cattle. 220
By 1916, the government had established the first Herero reserve, measuring 30,000
acres, and by 1921 additional reserves were granted for tribal use due to the extensive cattle
herds it controlled.221 The Herero were becoming increasingly independent, seeking ways to
express their identity. A Report on Native Affairs in 1919 stated that the Herero “have a very
independent spirit…The native with just a few head of cattle considers it [unfair] [to] dig to
work.”222 That same year, Namibia became a mandated territory of South Africa, and the Herero,
having undergone a radical reconstruction, would now push for political change. With the newlycreated South African administration, one that pushed racist policies and racial superiority, the
tribe soon realized that the inequality they had been subjected to under the Germans would
continue and their land would not be returned to them.223 These realizations that the new
government had the potential to be as unfavorable and dangerous as the German colonizers two
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decades prior, led tribespeople to unite in opposition.224 Following the expulsion of the Germans
and the South African mandate in the early 1920s, the Herero tribe, once on the brink of collapse,
was now attempting to rebuild its political autonomy.
Under the new government, Herero leaders, once in exile, returned to Namibia to
strengthen the new chieftainship. Hoseah Kutako, the son of Samuel Maherero, was made regent
of the tribe.225 It was during this time of transition that the Herero, historically militarized, once
again organized themselves into armed regiments, or Otruppe, commanded by tribal leaders.226
In 1920, the Universal Negro Improvement Association arrived in Namibia and the Herero
leaders quickly warmed to the organization, eventually granting allegiance to it. The UNIA
served as a catalyst for Herero communities to voice their grievances and accusations against the
South African government.227 The UNIA in Namibia quickly expanded, soon becoming
dominated in central Namibia by Herero, and by January 1922, 500 members were located in
Windhoek, with regional offices opening in Swakopmund and other locations.228 The UNIA
proved to be a crucial link to the political activity of the tribe for the next two decades, linking
members in Namibia to other societies all around the globe.229 The push for political power
amongst the Herero, started by the Universal Negro Improvement Association, would climax in
the aftermath of World War II.
After the end of World War II, a nationalist sentiment spread across the continent of
Africa. In Namibia, these feelings led to the discussions about the establishment of a political
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party mainly made up of Herero members.230 This newfound nationalistic sentiment spurred the
Herero to immediately set about petitioning the United Nations to vote against incorporating the
Namibian territory into the South African state, as was the original plan when the mandate was
given to the country.231 In 1947, Chief Frederick Maherero and the Herero Chiefs Council
drafted a petition to prevent incorporation into South Africa; in the 1950s, the Herero would send
representatives to New York City to physically hand in further petitions against the maneuver.232
The year 1959 saw Herero political ambitions become reality, with the creation of the South
West African National Union, a predominantly Herero political party. In the early 1960s, this
party internationalized the issues of the Herero tribe by opening foreign party offices, most
notably in Cairo, Egypt.233
Thus, the Herero tribe experienced a virtual rebirth and transformation after its near
demise in 1907. The increasing political power of this tribe, in comparison to the tribes in East
Africa, has caused the Herero and Nama genocide to become a nationwide event in
contemporary Namibia. Since 1923, the Herero people have commemorated “Herero Day.” This
date, August 26, marks the anniversary of the burial of Samuel Maherero in Oakhandja. In 1980,
this tribal holiday became a national holiday, and was renamed “Heroes Day,” to commemorate
the Namibian War of Independence, which began on August 26, 1966.234 Recently, the ruling
party of the Namibian government, the South West Africa People’s Organization, have attempted
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to increase awareness of the genocide and manage communal concerns amongst the Nama by
celebrating the lives of Hendrik Witbooi, the leader of the tribe during the rebellion.235
Physical memorials to the genocide are far more numerous, and widespread, than ones
dedicated to the Maji Maji Rebellion in East Africa. The most notable national memorial is
known as Heroes Acre, near Windhoek. This monument honors significant individuals that
fought against colonialism and contains tributes to numerous Herero and Nama leaders who
fought in the rebellion, including Witbooi, Maherero, and Jacob Morenga—a Nama guerilla
fighter.236 Monuments to the genocide are not only found in Namibia; there are also two
monuments that honor the native victims of the genocide located in Bremen, Germany.237
Numbers
Finally, numbers may be a factor is explaining the prominence of the events in Namibia,
whereas those in Tanzania are largely forgotten. Namibia, compared to Tanzania, saw many
more German soldiers deployed in response to the uprising (20,000 in Southwest Africa
compared to 2,000 in East Africa.) In Southwest Africa, the Schutztruppe—native Germans—
made up an overwhelming number of colonial soldiers fighting against the Herero and Nama.238
The numbers were very different in the case of East Africa, as the majority of the colonial
soldiers were not Germans; rather they were native Africans recruited into German service,
auxiliaries, or mercenaries. Additionally, the death rate among these German soldiers may have
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influenced how the public, both in Germany and the settlers in these African regions, responded
to these two concurrent events. The number of German soldiers who died in the campaigns
against the Herero and Nama between 1904 and 1907 stands at 1,500. Comparatively, the total
number of German soldiers who were killed during the Maji Maji Rebellion is only 15. With
such a higher death rate in Namibia, Germans may have been much more aware of the unfolding
calamity in Southwest Africa, where over 1,000 of their fellow compatriots died.
The number of German deaths may have influenced how the German settler population
and those in Germany remembered these two rebellions; however, the number of tribes involved
in each of these events may also have influenced the memorialization of these colonial crimes
against humanity. In the case of Southwest Africa, which involved two tribes, the Herero, as has
been seen, experienced a rebirth and revitalization of its leadership and lands. As a product of
this revival, the Herero were able to gain increasing political influence as the decades passed,
culminating with the establishment of their own political party. This political might allowed
them to describe, and keep alive, the event of 1904 on a national level, resulting in national and
international remembrance. In Tanzania, the story was drastically different. Instead of two tribes
involved in resisting colonial expansion, the Maji Maji uprising involved nearly 30 individual
tribes. These individual tribes, many of which experienced steep declines in both population and
leadership figures after the war and subsequent famine, did not have a collectively strong voice,
unlike the Herero. Add to this lack of voice the political disenfranchisement during the British
colonial government and the further loss of political power with forced villagization during the
1970s, after Tanzanian independence, and the political power and collective voice these tribes
have today is miniscule, compared to that of the Herero.
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Explaining the history and the subsequent remembrance and memorialization of two
events that have not received substantial public attention can prove to be difficult. How does one
explain the origins of memorialization of the events in Namibia and Tanzania, and explain how
and why the Herero and Nama genocide has received substantially more public visibility in
recent years than the Maji Maji Rebellion? In recent years, genocide studies have increased
exponentially, and with the tragedy in Namibia being a clear case of systematic, intentional
destruction of two peoples, this has led it to being increasingly studied as the first case of
genocide in the twentieth century; the Maji Maji rebellion in East Africa, meanwhile, has not
been framed by modern scholars as such an event.239 Connections to the Holocaust, both
structural connections—in the forms of concentration camps and medical experimentation—and
personal connections—Eugen Fischer, Franz Ritter von Epp, and Heinrich Goering— have led to
recent comparisons between the Holocaust and the Namibia rebellion, as well as substantial
investigations into whether the Herero and Nama genocide set a precedent for the Holocaust. The
Herero tragedy has also seen its physical aftermath, in the form of human remains spread around
the globe, bringing foreign countries into literal contact with the genocide. The attack on the
heart of the uprising in Tanzania, maji, through witchcraft eradication movements; and the
political differences between the once powerful Ngoni tribe in Tanzania and the Herero in
Namibia, with the former losing its power and identity through forced government social
programs, and the latter reorganizing, and reestablishing its important cultural and political
institutions that have allowed it to lead the call of remembrance and memorialization. These
variables have led to increased global attention on the tragedy in Namibia, which has led
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increased pressure on Germany to recognize the events in Namibia as genocide and a push for
reparations. Well into the twenty-first century, the German government did not recognize the
Herero and Nama uprising for what it was: genocide. However, after increased media attention
over the storage of human remains in both New York and Germany, the German government, in
July 2016, finally considered the events as genocidal in nature.240 Following on the heel of this
recognition, in January 2017, the Association of The Ovaherero Genocide in the USA sued
Germany in U.S court, demanding damages for the tragedy.241 Shortly thereafter, the government
of Namibia demanded $30 billion in reparations.242 As can be seen, recent events have begun to
shine a light of much needed, and deserved, attention on these events. While the factors stated
above have seemingly led the Namibian case to being covered, and remembered, more fully, the
scholarship on both of these events have experienced a revival within the past five years and
shows no signs of slowing as the reparations movements continue. The “Peace of the
Graveyard,” as Paul Rohrbach emotionally described a desolate Namibia, is no longer so quiet;
voices, calling for reparations, repatriations, and recognition, are steadily increasing in their furor
and strength. One can only hope that the increased attention and focus on Namibia will influence
reflection and action toward the other more widely forgotten rebellion in Tanzania.
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